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**13 August 1984**

## **Southeast Asia Report**

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13 August 1984

## SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## INDONESIA

Many South Sumatra Transmigrant Families Have Not Received Land (KOMPAS, 21 Jun 84) .....	1
Army To Help Repair South Sumatran Roads (MERDEKA, 22 Jun 84) .....	3
Better Pattern for Fishermen Credits Sought (HARIAN UMUM AB, 21 Jun 84) .....	5
High Costs, Difficulties of Resettling Fishermen Described (MERDEKA, 22 Jun 84) .....	7
Brig Gen Soeseno Dies (HARIAN UMUM AB, 29 Jun 84) .....	9
Briefs	
New Tambang Timah Director	10
Mukarto Notowidigdo Dies	10
New Pertamina General Director	10

## MALAYSIA

Briefs	
PRC-U.S. Military Cooperation	12

## PHILIPPINES

Briefs	
Rising National Crime Rate	13
Butuan Fighting Reported	13
Media Responsibility Urged	14
Marcos Orders Infrastructure Monitoring	14

## THAILAND

Leaders, Commentaries Continue Remarks on Lao Border (Various sources, various dates) .....	15
General: Villages Held by Lao Resistance	
Editorial Blames '3rd Country'	
Editorial Urges Non-Use of Force	
3rd Army Chief on Demarcation	
Kriangsak Discusses Problem	
Editorial on Lao Intransigence	
Editorial Blasts SRV	
Old Grievances With LPDR Cited, by Seni Saowaphong	
Thai Border Violators Killed (DAO SIAM, 28 Jun 84) .....	25
Yao Flee to Chiang Saen, Returned Home (DAO SIAM, 6 May 84) .....	27

## VIETNAM

### MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Bribery at Highway Inspection Stations Prevalent (VAN NGHE, 16 Jun 84) .....	28
---	----

### ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

Better Management To Suit Socioeconomic Characteristics Proposed (Vu Quoc Tuan; NGHIEN CUU KINH TE, No 2, Apr 84) .....	29
Shoddy Quality Tolerated To Meet Production Quota (LAO DONG, 28 Jun 84) .....	47
Double Counting Practiced To Meet Quotas (LAO DONG, 28 Jun 84) .....	48
Quotas Manipulated To Agree With Production (LAO DONG, 28 Jun 84) .....	49

### BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities .....	50
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# MANY SOUTH SUMATRA TRANSMIGRANT FAMILIES HAVE NOT RECEIVED LAND

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 21 Jun 84 p 2

[Text] A shortfall of 17,230 hectares of agricultural land for 24,536 transmigrant families settled in South Sumatra during PELITA [5-Year Plan] III has not been completely made up. There are still 300 hectares of Enterprise I land and 11,500 hectares of Enterprise II land which have not been distributed to those who have the right to it. However, 181 hectares of orchard land have been handed over.

Drs Herry Soenarso, head of the South Sumatra regional office of the department of transmigration, made this statement in response to questions from KOMPAS reporters at a press conference chaired by Drs H. T. Simanjuntak, chairman of the South Sumatra Regional Planning Board, last Monday [18 June] in Palembang. He did not spell out why the transmigrants had not yet received the land. "We hope there will be no further land problems once the level of service is increased during PELITA IV," he said.

Between 1978 and 1983, 24,536 transmigrant families failed to receive their 2-hectare allotments. They were settled in nine dry and wet land areas: Sekayu, Betung and Air Saleh (MUBA), Kelingi and Ngestiboga (MURA), Pematang Panggang (OKI), Sugihwaras (Muaraenim), Bungamas (Lahat) and Batumarta (OKU).

## There Is No Land

According to the report of 30 June 1983 surveying the transmigration land lots, the reason for the shortfall is lack of land. In Betung, Batumarta and Bungamas, the land goals of Enterprise II land have not yet been fulfilled. In Sekayu, Enterprise II reserve land was claimed by long-time residents as smallholder rubber plantation land. In Air Saleh, the land survey caused a fight. In Pematang Panggang, Enterprise I land lots were still forested; Enterprise II land had not even been laid out. In Ngestiboga, land slated for orchards and for Enterprise I and II land turned out to be the local residents' dry fields.

## PELITA III and IV

During PELITA III, according to Herry Soenarso, transmigration settlement in South Sumatra involved 80,234 families (344,598 people), 5,168 families short of the target of 85,402 families. It is hoped that this shortfall can be made up during the first year of PELITA IV. PELITA III nevertheless represents a big increase over PELITA II, when only 13,250 families (60,373 people) were settled. There are now 86,707 families (376,739 people) being trained in 42 Transmigration Settlement Units (SPT).



Plans are to place 76,506 families during PELITA IV. During the first year alone, 3,000 self-supporting families and 12,393 general families will be placed, 3,000 of the families on Smallholders' Nuclear Estates (PIR), 8,030 on wet land and 4,363 on dry land.

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CSO: 4213/246

## ARMY TO HELP REPAIR SOUTH SUMATRAN ROADS

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 22 Jun 84 p 4

[Excerpts] Herry Winarso, head of the South Sumatra regional office of the Department of Transportation, told reporters on Monday [18 June] in Palembang that Brig Gen Rustandi A.M., commander of the Sriwijaya Division, KODAM [Regional Military Command] IV, will soon bring in the army engineers to repair damaged roads and bridges in South Sumatran resettlement areas.

According to Winarso, KODAM IV's territorial assistant told his office of their availability because almost all of the roads and bridges in this region's resettlement area have been severely damaged and it is time to repair them.

He said that a team from KODAM IV and a team from the regional transmigration office will move into several resettlement areas in July. Repair and rehabilitation cannot be put off any longer or the transmigrants will become isolated and unable to market their produce, said Winarso, quoting KODAM IV's territorial assistant.

## Four Billion Rupiahs

This statement opened the first press conference in the South Sumatra regional government's program of information to the press and the public. Drs H. T. Simanjuntak, chairman of the South Sumatra regional development board and public relations bureau head, was the host and organizer.

Herry Winarso said that according to preliminary figures, 2,000 km of roads will be repaired and rehabilitated. However, H. T. Simanjuntak said, in accordance with what the governor of South Sumatra requested of the national planning board in Jakarta recently, that 5,859.07 km of heavily-damaged roads will be repaired.

The breakdown is as follows: 227.87 km of feeder roads, 1,582.02 km of main roads and 4,049 km of village roads.

In addition, other transportation facilities which have not been touched in 5 years and are therefore heavily damaged include 1,294 bridges, a total of 6,669 meters, on main and feeder roads and 2,588 bridges, a total of 12,983 meters, in villages. There are also 3,882 bridges with a total length of 19,407 meters that are listed for rehabilitation.

The governor has asked the national planning board in Jakarta for the necessary 4 billion rupiahs. H. T. Simanjuntak said that an additional 1 billion rupiahs will be needed to repair transportation facilities and canals in the province's tidal region.

#### Unmarketable

Between 1950 and PELITA [5-Year Plan] III, 124,682 families or 539,052 people have been resettled in south Sumatra. Between 1950 and 1968, in the pre-PELITA era, there were 22,999 families or 97,355 people resettled. In PELITA I the numbers were 8,199 families or 36,726 people, in PELITA II, 13,250 families and in PELITA III 80,234 families or 344,598 people.

Up to May 1984, there were 86,707 families or 376,739 people still in the training stages at 42 resettlement units (SPT) and 192 resettlement units (UPT).

As a result of such transfers as parts of a family, family resettlements, and self-supporting and spontaneous transmigration, the number rose to 90,119 families or 389,731 people, an increase of 3,492 families.

Transmigration under PELITA IV will increase not only in numbers but also in efforts to improve the quality of the transmigrants' life. Under PELITA IV 76,506 families will be resettled.

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# BETTER PATTERN FOR FISHERMEN CREDITS SOUGHT

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 21 Jun 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] Abdu Rachman, director general of fisheries, stated that he and the coordinating minister for economy, finance and industry are looking for a pattern of credit specifically for fishermen, to be put into effect immediately. In his evaluation, the BIMAS [Mass Guidance] program and the KIK/KMKP [Small Investment Credit/Permanent Working Capital Credit] programs have not been able to solve the credit problems faced by fishermen.

As an example, he mentioned that the KIK/KMKP credit ceiling of 13 million rupiahs is not enough to buy a boat measuring 10 gross tons; this actually requires up to 30 million rupiahs.

The same is true of the terms of credit; it is now being suggested that the time limit be extended from 3 years to 5 years at an interest rate of 12 percent a year and that the grace period be extended from 6 months to 1 year.

It is hoped that such a credit pattern can reach more of the fishing community.

Up to PELITA [5-Year Plan] III, the credit pattern for fishermen followed the BIMAS and the KIK/KMKP patterns.

To support development projects for fishermen and fish-farmers, the government has tried to make credit available through bank funds. Credit facilities made available include a KIK/KMKP credit of 4.898 billion rupiahs; 22.3 percent of this was used through 1982. In addition, an RCP [expansion unknown] credit of 52.4 billion rupiahs was made available for fish ponds, tanks, breeding, and the construction of refrigeration plants; 13.9 billion of this had been spent by 1982. The BIMAS credit was 59.1 billion rupiahs, with 81.9 percent used by 1982.

## Increasing

With the help of these credits, fish production has increased, on the average, by 5.3 percent a year, from 1.648 million tons in 1978 to 2.12 million tons in 1983. This level of production represents 06.6 percent [as published] of the estimated renewable fishing potential of 8 million tons per year.

In addition, fish exports have averaged a 6.8 percent growth in volume and a 5.7 percent growth in value.

In 1978, fish exports were only 63.485 tons, with a value of 193.4 million dollars; by 1983 this had increased to 88.3 tons, with a value of 255.6 million dollars.

Meanwhile, 73 percent, or 13.12 kg per capita per year, of the need for animal protein from fish, 18 kg per capita per year, had been reached by 1983. This was not spread equally over the country, however. The level of fish consumption in Java and Bali is still very low, especially in the villages.

As for the effects of KEPPRES [Presidential Order] 39/1980, Abdu Rachman said that he was working with the universities to survey the socioeconomic effects of the elimination of trawls in several areas along Java's north coast and in the Straits of Malacca. This survey, to be completed by the end of 1984, will find out how much the elimination of trawls has increased the income of traditional fishermen.

This survey will also examine the biological effects of overfishing on shrimp potential in these areas. These are the main points which the director general of fisheries made at a press conference held yesterday afternoon at his office.

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# HIGH COSTS, DIFFICULTIES OF RESETTLING FISHERMEN DESCRIBED

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 22 Jun 84 pp 1, 11

[Text] Efforts to resettle fishermen from the heavily populated and overexploited areas along the north coast of Java to areas which still have enough fishing potential have run into high costs, about 9.6 million rupiahs per family. Ordinary transmigration costs are about 4 million rupiahs per family.

Prof Dr J. H. Hutasoit, junior minister for livestock and fisheries (UP4), made this statement in Jakarta on Thursday [21 June] in an exclusive interview with MERDEKA about government efforts to resettle fishermen during PELITA [5-Year Plan] III.

According to Hutasoit, in addition to the rather high costs of resettling fishermen and providing an infrastructure, the government has also had problems relocating fishermen in areas with good resources and marketing.

Before selecting a resettlement area, intensive surveys and research must be carried out. "It costs a lot to do that," said Hutasoit. These surveys and research are an obstacle to government planning of new transmigration projects for fishermen.

As a pilot project, according to Hutasoit, the government is resettling fishermen from Java in the Kurau area of Bangka. About 250 families were supposed to be resettled but only 100 actually were.

He said that many fishermen were reluctant to move because when a fisherman moves to another area he has to look around for the best fishing spots and this takes a long time. "This is the problem," said Hutasoit.

Besides the high cost of resettlement and of providing the means of production (boats, engines and fishing gear), there is also the problem of marketing the catch.

Facilities for marketing the catch, according to Hutasoit, which are so vital and decisive in the chain of life, must be provided as soon as possible. If marketing facilities are not made available in the new area, the fishermen will just return to where they came from.

He said that it is very expensive to provide good marketing facilities because besides making available a dock where public sales can take place a refrigeration plant must also be constructed so that the fish will stay fresh longer.

## Fish-farming

Because there are so many problems in resettling fishermen, the government is taking alternative measures. One is to change the fishermen from fishing at sea to raising fish in ponds, especially shrimp ponds.

"We are suggesting that each family be provided with 2 hectares of land (5 hectares in the future)," said Hutasoit. A survey has determined that the Luwu area of South Sumatra and Santong Gulf in West Nusa Tenggara are very good for the resettlement of fish-farmers.

Since raising shrimp in ponds requires a high degree of technology in its first stages, the TIR [Smallholders Nuclear Fishponds] enterprise must make available seed shrimp, medicine and the means of preserving the shrimp. Under the TIR system the fish-farmer has the right to about 80 percent of the pond and the company about 20 percent.

Hutasoit said that plans are for an estimated 10,000 hectares to be made available for transmigrant fish-farmers. They will therefore get to own 8,000 hectares. If each family gets 2 hectares, about 4,000 families can be resettled.

As a pilot project, the government has done research on shrimp cultivation and seeding. The estimated \$50 million (50 billion rupiahs) spent on these activities was obtained from the Asia Development Bank and eight foreign experts were brought in.

Besides the recent Asia Development Bank project, a BANGPRES [Presidential Aid] pilot project will also be put into effect soon. This fishpond project will cover about 350 hectares in Karawang.

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## BRIG GEN SOESEN0 DIES

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 29 Jun 84 p 8

[Article: "DIRBINLEM LEMHANNAS Brig Gen TNI Soeseno Dies"]

[Excerpts] Jakarta, (AB)--Brig Gen TNI [Indonesian National Army] Soeseno, director for the development of national defense institutes (DIRBINLEM LEMHANNAS) died of a heart attack at the Gatot Subroto Hospital in Jakarta on Wednesday, 27 June.

He performed his duties devotedly while serving in ABRI [Indonesian Armed Forces] in both domestic and overseas assignments. Brig Gen Soeseno was born in Semarang (Central Java) on 5 September 1928. His military career began in 1951 at the Netherlands Breda Academy from which he graduated with the rank of Army cadet officer (CAPA) on 1 August 1954.

As an Army officer, his training included the following: Company Commander Course (SUSKI) in 1961, Army Command and Staff School (SESROAD) in 1966, 8th National Defense Institute's Forces Open Warfare Course (KRA) in 1975, and the Defense Attache Course (SUS ATHAN) in 1971. As a Javanese, the deceased, in addition to being fluent in the Sunda dialect, had a good command of the English, Dutch, Yugoslavian, and Japanese languages.

Brig Gen Soeseno served as commander of Platoon 1/III/330 in 1954, commander of Headquarters Company Battalion 321 in 1955, Infantry Cadre School instructor (SKI) in 1956, commander of cadet company, National Military Academy [AMN] in 1957, commander of cadet battalion in 1960, chief of Section 5, 161st Territorial Regiment, XVIth, Udayana, Military District Command, in 1963, 2d deputy assistant for operations, Airborne Combat Command, in 1966, 2d assistant for operations, Airborne Combat Command, defense attache assigned to Japan in 1970, assistant for planning, Research and Development Center, in 1974, studies director, National Defense Institute [LEMHANNAS], in 1978. Thereafter, he held various positions in the LEMHANNAS, from secretary to DIRBINLEM, the post he held at the time of his death.

Brig Gen Soeseno served overseas in Yugoslavia in 1964, in Australia in 1974, in Japan in 1976, and he headed the LEMHANNAS KRA delegation to the ASEAN nations in 1978. He received 11 awards including the Kartika Eka Paksi Star, Service Star, First Independence War Medal, Second Independence War Medal, Medals for Military Operations 1, 5 and 6, Maintainer Medal, Meritorious Medal for Teachers and Instructors, Medal for 32 years Continuous Service.

Gen Soeseno leaves a wife and three children.

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CSO: 4213/249



## BRIEFS

**NEW TAMBANG TIMAH DIRECTOR**--Jakarta, 23 June--On Saturday morning [23 June], Subroto, minister of mining and energy, installed Air Marshal, TNI [Indonesian National Army], (ret.) Sudjatmiko as executive director of PERTAMINA [National Oil and Natural Gas Company], replacing A.R. Ramly. Marshal Sudja-miko was born in Teban on 17 October 1927. In 1952, he graduated from the U.S. Flight Academy, where he earned both pilot and flight instructor licenses, and he graduated from the Royal Air Force Staff College in Andover, England, in 1961. During his military career, Marshal Sudjatmiko served as a pilot, flight inspector, commander of the Flight School, commander of the Kalijati and Adisutjipto Air Bases, and director of organization at the Air Force Headquarters. In 1965 he was promoted to commander of the 1st Air Region Command in Medan with the rank of Air Vice Marshal. Thereafter he served as assistant for operations to the minister/ Air Force commander at Air Force Headquarters in Jakarta. From 1969 to 1973 he commanded the National Air Defense Command at the Department of Defense and Security. From 1974 to 1978 he served as chairman of the Batam Authority Project on Batam Island, executive director of PT Bersero Batam, and chairman of the Batam agency in Singapore. He held the post of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Singapore from 1978 to 1984. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 23 Jun 84 pp 1, 12] 6804

**MUKARTO NOTOWIDIGDO DIES**--Jakarta, 25 June--Mukarto Notowidigdo, Indonesia's seventh foreign minister, died on Monday morning [25 June] in Jakarta. He served as foreign minister from April 1952 to July 1953. Following his term as foreign minister, Mukarto served as ambassador to the United States and then as Indonesia's permanent representative to the United Nations from 1953 to 1960, ambassador to India from 1960 to 1964 and ambassador to Canada from 1964 to 1966. He was born in Blora, Central Java, on 1 November 1910. Mukarto leaves a wife, three married sons, and two grandchildren. [Excerpts] [Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 25 Jun 84 pp 1, 12] 6804

**NEW PERTAMINA GENERAL DIRECTOR**--Brig Gen (ret.) Soedarno Martosewojo, long employed by PERTAMINA [National Oil and Gas Company] and most recently advisor to the PERTAMINA executive director, has replaced Wijarso, age 54, as director general for oil and natural gas. Wijarso, a 13-year veteran leader in Pertamina, left the organization after serving only 10 days as oil and gas general director following the resignation of Joedo Sumbono. This time the taciturn Soedarno will not just run with the baton passed to

him by Wijarso. When Wijarso was director of the Oil and Natural Gas Directorate General, Soedarno was appointed by then executive director of PERTAMINA Piet Haryono to handle the reins as general director. The incumbent of this position in practice supervises almost all fields of PERTAMINA activity--"a kind of chief of staff," as one oil official said. Soedarno, an alumnus of the Bandung Institute of Technology and Brunswick University in West Germany, is also known for his great experience in the LNG [liquified natural gas] field. From Presidential Instruction of 7 April, it can be assumed that this chemical engineer will be leaving his job as head of the oil and marketing group. Gen Soedarno, who was born in Purbolinggo, Central Java, has held various positions in the state-owned oil and natural gas companies since 1960. When PN [state-owned company] PETAMIN [Natural Oil Company] and PN PERTAMINA were merged under the PERTAMINA umbrella in August 1968, Soedarno was appointed vice director for refining while the then executive director, Ibnu Sutowo, appointed Drs Joedo Sumbono as vice director for domestic supplies. Of the various directors who served under Ibnu Sutowo, Soedarno is the only survivor, and his star is rising now that he is the oil and natural gas general director. During the Joedo Sumbono era, "insiders" were selected as directors although some later were brought in from the outside. [Excerpts] [Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian 30 Jun 84 p 68] 6804

CSO: 4213/249

## BRIEFS

PRC-U.S. MILITARY COOPERATION--The deputy minister of foreign affairs, Encik Kadir Sheikh Fadzir, told the Dewan Negara [Senate] that the government is to look for the best way by which Malaysian businessmen can participate and exploit the opportunity in China's development. He expressed concern of any kind of military cooperation between China and America. The deputy minister pointed out that the government had repeatedly reminded the United States of China's threat to the peace in this region. In the Malaysian context, the worry is also due to the continued recognition by the Chinese Government of the banned Malaya's Communist Party [as heard]. He added that the U.S. Government should not hand over the responsibility of looking after the security in this region to China. [Text] [BK311341 Kuala Lumpur Domestic Service in English 1130 GMT 31 Jul 84]

CSO: 4200/941

## BRIEFS

**RISING NATIONAL CRIME RATE**--For the first time in recent years, PC-INP [Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police] Chief Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos today disclosed that the national crime situation has increased to 8 percent over the previous year's volume [as heard]. At the same time General Ramos said that the first half of 1984 was marked by bolder depredations by the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army in remote areas of Mindanao, Visayas, and some parts of Luzon. Correspondent Jun Francisco reports on this: [Begin recording] In an interview with members of the Defense Press Corps, Ramos traced the increase in crime volume to the present economic hardships, population pressures, and the urgent lack of public utilities. He said, in 1983 the crime volume nationwide reached 165,000 [word indistinct] incidents. Ramos also disclosed that the PC-INP command is pursuing three major thrusts to arrest the spread of crime. These are: the improved collaboration among various sectors of the community, involving concerned citizens and local officials through the peace and order councils; the bridging of what Ramos called the information gap, which requires the support of the media; and the continued weeding out of undesirable personnel and the improvement of discipline within the ranks of the PC-INP. [End recording] [Text] [HK021125 Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 1100 GMT 2 Aug 84]

**BUTUAN FIGHTING REPORTED**--In Mount Hilong-Hilong near Butuan City, government forces have killed 21 rebels and captured 16 others in an air and ground operation around the mountain. Reports said there are possibilities that Mindanao's top communist and NPA leader, Benjamin Deverra, and another top NPA leader, George Madlos, were among the rebels killed. Deverra has a 200,000 peso prize for his capture, dead or alive. The regional unified command in Cagayan de Oro City said air force helicopters and artillery backed up the ground troops in the attack. The government forces suffered one killed, a draftee indentified as (Antonio Mahilong). Nine others were wounded. Regional Commander Brigadier General (Madrino Munos) said he ordered the attack following reports that Deverra and 19 other top NPA commanders are meeting in the area. [Text] [HK280005 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2245 GMT 27 Jul 84]

**MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY URGED**--Information Minister Gregorio Cendana yesterday [28 July] called on the broadcast media to exercise their responsibility with greater regard for public interest, particularly during this period of national crisis. In his address before the Radio and TV Federation of the Philippines, Minister Cendana said that broadcast journalists are invested with a moral and legal responsibility to serve public interests to the best of their abilities. Freedom of speech and of press does not carry with it the right of privileges to betray this trust. Minister Cendana said that people in government are aware of the tendency to misuse this. This situation, according to the minister, is indeed something to be deplored, particularly at this time when the government is trying to harness all available resources into the task of economic recovery. [Text] [HK290100 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2245 GMT 28 Jul 84]

**MARCOS ORDERS INFRASTRUCTURE MONITORING**--President Marcos today ordered the strict monitoring of all infrastructure projects, on which the government spends 1.4 billion pesos every year. The president made the move to ensure the judicious and optimum use of government funds in the public works program. Mr Marcos issued the order to Public Works and Highways Minister Jesus Hipolito. The chief executive has received reports that many barangay roads and school-building projects undertaken by the local governments could stand more improvement. [Text] [HK301131 Quezon City Maharlika Broadcasting System in English 1100 GMT 30 Jul 84]

CSO: 4200/945



THAILAND

LEADERS, COMMENTARIES CONTINUE REMARKS ON LAO BORDER

General: Villages Held By Lao Resistance

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 29 Jun 84 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Situation Along the Uttaradit Border Still Peaceful: Commanding General of the Third Army Area Talks About the Three Villages, 'Where Did the Newspapers Get Their Information'"]

[Text] The commanding general of the Third Army Area said that the situation in Uttaradit is normal and that nothing has changed. He said that he doesn't know where the newspapers got their information that Vietnam and Laos had sent forces to confront Thailand. Talk of forces being sent in just harms the country. If this were true, it would not have been kept secret. At the same time, a military news source said that there have been problems since March.

Lieutenant General Thiep Kromsuriyasak, the commanding general of the Third Army Area, talked with SIAM RAT about the situation along the Thai-Lao border in Uttaradit Province. According to reports, Vietnam and Laos supposedly sent forces to confront Thai forces and seize three villages that night. He said that nothing had happened. Because if anything had happened, he would have been informed. At present, nothing has changed. Our forces are still guarding the villages.

Concerning the reports that stated that Vietnam and Laos had sent in forces to confront Thai [forces] and seize three villages, Lieutenant General Thiep said that he is still puzzled by these reports and has no idea where or how the newspapers got their information. Before printing a news report, they should have a reliable source of information.

"Such talk is harmful to the country. Thais like to make a noise about things. I don't agree with this," said Lieutenant General Thiep.

Lieutenant General Thiep also said that if this had really happened, why would we try to conceal the matter? However, if there is only a 30-50 percent chance that this happened, as a soldier, he doesn't want to say anything since that would put us at a disadvantage. [He will comment] only if the chance that that happened is 70 percent or better.

A news report issued by the army informed SIAM RAT that this area used to be under the influence of communist terrorists. And besides that, Lao resistance groups were active there. This made it difficult for Thai officials to go into that area. However, after officials implemented the "politics leads the military" policy in accord with Order 66/1980, the influence of the communist terrorists waned and officials were able to clear the area and build roads there.

However, last March, Thai officials were shot. And the same thing happened in May. This troubled us and so we sent forces to protect those building the roads. After that, Vietnam launched a major attack against Thailand and made many charges. We wanted to negotiate with Laos, but Laos refused to negotiate since Vietnam was applying pressure on them. It is thought that it will be a long time before Laos negotiates with us.

"I just returned from there. There are some Lao forces stationed opposite us. But there is no confrontation. They are inside their territory and are maintaining their country's sovereignty just as our forces are doing," said a news report. It said that the problem between Thailand and Laos is a very minor matter. Actually, the Thai and Lao people have the same lineage.

The news report stated that the reports that Vietnam had sent troops into that area were totally false. There may be a few military advisors there since Vietnamese and Soviet military advisors are everywhere.

The news source also said that at present, the situation is calm, and the people are living in peace. There is no fighting, and no clashes have taken place. Road construction is proceeding as usual. We are still using troops to guard road construction, but nothing violent has taken place.

"I can confirm that there has been no movement by the Lao forces. They have not sent in reinforcements. Also, the aid sent to Laos by the Thai government has not been reduced." The news report said that during the period 21-27 June, a crossing point was opened in Chiang Khong District in Chiang Rai Province. Next month, the two sides will join in releasing "buk" fish into the Mekong River.

#### Editorial Blames '3rd Country'

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 27 Jun 84 p 3

[Editorial: "The Events Involving Thailand and Laos"]

[Text] The events along the Thai-Lao border have become a problem and turned into a dispute. Laos has used military forces and weapons against Thailand, and Thailand has had to defend itself. Thus, this has become an international problem.

At present, we are pleased that the Thai government, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has asked the ambassadors of various countries, particularly the ambassadors of the ASEAN and European Common Market countries, to come listen to reports by high-level officials on the events that have taken place. The purpose of this has been to inform Thailand's friends about the actual situation.

We feel that this type of action is the best way of handling things. Because such action shows that Thailand is making a great effort to preserve the peace in the best interests of both countries and prevent a more serious or violent dispute from occurring.

Thailand and Laos have long had friendly relations, and these friendly relations are unlike those between other countries. Friendly relations between Thailand and Laos are like those between brothers since our origins, traditions, customs and spoken and written languages are quite similar.

Disputes, whether incited by a third country or due to some misunderstanding, should not occur, especially with Laos, which Thailand still has friendly feelings toward just as if it were a younger brother.

Our understanding is that Laos did what it did because a third country wants to cause problems along our border with Laos in addition to [causing problems] along the Thai-Kampuchean border and that it wants to incite disorder to provide it with an excuse to violate Thailand's sovereignty.

If Laos really is being used as a cover like this, that is very sad for Thailand. Because whether at the government-to-government level or at the people-to-people level, Thailand and Laos have never been at odds about anything.

Concerning the fact that Thailand has called in the ambassadors of various countries to inform them of what took place, we feel that this has had several good results. For example, this shows that Thailand still wants to preserve peace and that it wants to preserve peace and happiness in the world. Second, this shows that Thailand still desires to have friendly relations with Laos. Third, it shows that Thailand wants to solve the problems using political and diplomatic means rather than using military forces and weapons, which might lead to even more violence. Finally, this shows the world how and why this happened.

We hope that Thailand's actions, through the Thai government, achieve good results in accord with Thailand's good intentions and hopes. That is, Thailand wants there to be peace and happiness in Asia while some countries are trying to stir up trouble by invading and threatening Thailand.

## Editorial Urges Non-Use of Force

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 14 Jun 84 p 3

[Editorial: "A Fact That Should Not Be Ignored"]

[Text] The border dispute between Thailand and Laos was still smoldering last week after Thai officials retook the three villages in Uttaradit Province that had been occupied by Lao troops and developed the area to prevent this from happening again. Laos has filed a diplomatic protest, and Thailand's actions have been attacked by Radio Vientiane, which has demanded the return of the three villages, which Laos claims belong to it.

We have said many times that Thailand and Laos should solve their problems peacefully using diplomatic means. Even though Thailand and Laos are two separate countries, culturally, since ancient times relations between the two peoples have been closer than those of any other pair of neighboring countries. Thus, we should be able to solve these problems like brothers.

Disputes about the exact location of the border are quite possible since no definite boundary line, either because of the terrain or the actions of government officials, exists. But even so, we have long had an agreement on the boundary line, particularly in the large area stretching from Nan to Loei. These documents can be reviewed as a basis for holding negotiations at all levels, that is, from the local to the national committee level.

We agree with those Thais concerned who think that the problem should not be solved through the use of force but through negotiations and that this should be a firm position in this policy in the belief that Thailand and Laos can be good neighbors.

The things that have happened along the border should not become a major issue if Laos can implement its policies independently and does not allow a wedge to be driven between us even though the two countries have always cooperated closely. In particular, Laos is almost totally dependent on Thailand for the daily necessities of life.

During this period of international trickery, those who are trying to expand their influence are using tricks to take control of Southeast Asia. Indochina is becoming a major problem [since] it is using a negative policy toward other countries in the region. These things are done in various ways. One way is to turn minor, easily solved problems into major problems that are difficult to solve and to use international "stages" to gain the advantage. This can be seen in the case of Kampuchea, one of the Indochinese countries that has fallen victim to such influence.



We don't believe that Laos wants to threaten Thailand or turn these minor events into major problems unless it has fallen under the influence of others who have bad intentions toward Thailand. This uncharacteristic attitude of Laos and its unwillingness to listen clearly shows who is behind these events and who gave the orders.

These are facts. And they have clearly shown us what is behind the situation so that we can prepare ourselves.

### 3rd Army Chief on Demarcation

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 29 May 84 pp 1, 12

[Article: "The Commanding General of the Third Army Area Says That Mountain Ranges Should Be Demarcation Line; This Will Solve the Problem of Border Incursions"]

[Excerpts] Concerning the events along the Thai-Lao border, the prime minister has said that Thailand does not want to engage in a dispute and that it wants to hold friendly negotiations. He said that he agrees with the view of the commanding general of the Third Army Area, who wants to establish a clear border demarcation line by using the mountain peaks as the demarcation line.

Red Lao soldiers crossed the border and seized [three] Thai villages located in Uttaradit Province near the Lao border. There was a clash with Thai forces, and soldiers on both sides were wounded.

Concerning this, Lieutenant General Thiep Kromsuriyasak, the commanding general of the Third Army Area, told SIAM RAT that things are now back to normal. Officials are conducting an investigation to determine why this took place. This may have resulted from a misunderstanding. If there is mutual understanding, things will probably improve.

Lieutenant General Thiep said that he has already sent a report to higher echelons informing them about how he intends to solve the problem. However, he thinks that the root of this problem is that the mountains [here] are used as a border demarcation line. If the two sides negotiate and [agree] to a clear border demarcation line, the problems can be solved.

"I think that this is a matter for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They will probably make contact and solve the problem. I am a soldier and so I can't do much," said Lieutenant General Thiep. The mountain peaks should be used as the border demarcation line, with the line running down the middle, since the mountains are like a fence. However, it is up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take action on this. His [General Thiep] only duty is to ensure that no one invades our territory.

As for the problem of Thais sneaking across the border and stealing the buffalo and cattle of Lao villagers, Lieutenant General Thiep said that based on his experiences in carrying out tasks along the border,



such problems do exist. That is, people do get into such arguments quite often. But concerning the border here, problems concerning cattle and buffalo are not the issue here. The problems here have arisen from the fact that the mountains do not form a clear border demarcation line.

Mr Phisan Mulasatsathon, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, talked with reporters about the seizure of border villages in Uttaradit Province. He said that he had not received a report about this from provincial officials and that the military would have to be the one to issue a statement about this. Because the National Security Council has already said that this is a minor matter. However, if they cross into our territory, we will drive them out; we certainly won't let them seize our territory. No one can violate our sovereignty. If provincial officials encounter problems, they will send a report.

General Prem Tinsulanon spoke about this before going to attend a cabinet meeting this morning (29 May). He said that "we don't want to engage in a dispute. We want to discuss matters in a friendly manner."

However, General Prem said that the problem that has arisen must be studied in much greater detail. As for the border demarcation line between Thailand and Laos, the boundary must be demarcated very clearly. The ministries concerned such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Council will be in charge of this in order to obtain clear evidence on the exact location of the border. We will discuss this with Laos so that there is mutual understanding.

"At present, both sides have stopped [fighting]. Now, we must talk to each other," said General Prem when asked what the situation is like at present.

When asked if he intends to go see the situation for himself, General Prem said "I probably won't have time. The commanding general of the Third Army Area and Uttaradit provincial officials are monitoring things closely.

#### Kriangsak Discusses Problem

Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 30 Jun 84 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Old Treaties Go to the Thai-Lao Negotiating Table"]

[Excerpt] In his capacity as the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, General Kriangsak Chamanan talked with reporters about the results of yesterday's subcommittee meeting. He said that representatives from the Ministry of Interior, the Police Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been asked to come and speak before the subcommittee. The data obtained show that efforts to solve the problem concerning the three villages located along the Thai-Lao border in Uttaradit Province are proceeding well. At present, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is

handling things quite well. It has prevented a minor matter from developing into a major problem. These three villages encompass only a small area. We should improve mutual understanding and solve this problem. Because these three villages are located near the border, and there are no clear boundary markers. To solve this problem, we will have to sit down at the negotiating table and discuss the old treaties and the facts.

General Kriangsak said that based on the existing data, it is believed that Thailand and Laos should be able to reach an understanding. It won't cost either side anything [to talk]. Both countries must negotiate and listen to the views of the other. He criticized the mass media in Thailand and said that the press should not use rude or aggressive language toward Laos since this might ruin the atmosphere during the negotiations with Laos and damage friendly [relations]. He asked people not to get overly excited by these news reports. He does not think that anything serious will occur. At present, it can be seen that both sides are taking a less strident attitude.

At the same time, General Kriangsak denied that Laos plans to cancel the negotiations. A representative from the Ministry of Interior confirmed that negotiations will be held at various echelons.

#### Editorial On Lao Intransigence

Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 18 Jun 84 p 4

[Editorial: "A Chronic Problem"]

[Text] The attempt by Thailand to reach an agreement with Laos on the border problem became even more difficult when Vietnam interfered with the peaceful negotiations between Thailand and Laos by spreading propaganda to the effect that Thailand had invaded Laos. This damaged our reputation in the eyes of the people of the world, who did not know the facts. And it must be admitted that Vietnam's propaganda was much more efficient than ours. Thus, the government and the units concerned with the border problem must be much more careful in issuing news reports. We must not act like a "big" country that is using its power to threaten a small country, which would give the enemy an opportunity to criticize us.

The Thai government has made a great effort to solve the Thai-Lao border problem by holding brotherly negotiations. Ten to 20 years ago, this would have been a realistic possibility. But now, Laos has better relations with other countries than it does with Thailand. When people say that we are still fraternal countries, that is just diplomatic talk or words spoken during negotiations in the hope of profiting from Thailand. As for the dispute that has arisen, this is a major international matter. It could easily lead to a major confrontation between the Free-World camp and the communist camp unless the problem is solved before it gets out of hand. This is a fact that is easy to see but difficult to

talk about. Even though we have conclusive evidence and maps, if the other side is unwilling to listen, [the evidence] is meaningless.

The fact that Laos has agreed to hold diplomatic negotiations should not lead people to believe that it will be easy to solve this problem. Because these diplomatic negotiations may just be a ploy to gain time to prepare forces and volunteers for retaliation later on. The government must quickly inform the people of the world and friendly countries about what has really taken place and get them to see that the land under dispute legally belongs to Thailand. Don't be misled into thinking that this problem can be solved easily. This is like an international political bomb that will take time to defuse, just as in the case of the Thai-Kampuchean border dispute or the Chinese-Vietnamese border dispute.

#### Editorial Blasts SRV

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 27 Jun 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Keep Up With Vietnam"]

[Text] The conflict between Thailand and Laos over the three villages has now become very alarming. While Thailand is trying to end the conflict, Laos is continually "adding more fuel to the fire." Analyzing the position of the Lao government, Laos will definitely not use diplomatic means and open negotiations with Thailand. Laos has announced that Thailand must first withdraw its troops from the three villages before Laos will open negotiations. That is the first condition set by Laos.

The next step by Laos was to mobilize the masses and get them to harbor ill feelings toward Thailand. At the same time, Vietnam spread propaganda attacking Thailand on the international front and sent a statement to the United Nations condemning Thailand. Following that, Laos and Vietnam sent troops and weapons to the point of conflict. Then, Radio Laos reported that Lao soldiers had attacked Thai forces, killing or wounding many Thai soldiers. The Thai forces fired artillery shells into Laos.

The conflict between Thailand and Laos has now reached the point where it is about to turn into a war, which is something that Thailand does not want at all. But it seems that Vietnam and Laos want to start a war in order to follow their propaganda plans. Because if Thailand, in accord with the policy of remaining calm, refrains from taking action and no fighting breaks out, the ones to lose face will be Vietnam and Laos, who have spread propaganda throughout the world appealing for sympathy and attacking Thailand.

Clashes have already taken place; this is a fact that must be admitted. And the situation is becoming even more serious. What the Thai government must realize is that Vietnam and Laos have beaten Thailand in the race to spread propaganda on the international front. Even though this is a filthy method, Vietnam and Laos are very skilled at this. Thus, the Thai government must keep up with Vietnam's filthy propaganda game. That

is, the person who makes charges or attacks first on the world stage has the advantage and can then try to have everything follow in accord with his propaganda.

Besides this, another thing that Thai officials must be aware of is that they must not keep what has happened a secret. They must inform the people. Because the Thai people have a right to know about things that affect the country. Why were reports of attacks on Thai soldiers by Lao forces first broadcast on Radio Laos and only later on the Thai military radio? The policy of remaining calm in order to bring about peace is a good policy. But this does not mean that everything has to be kept secret from the people. This could be bad for our policy. And if this is the case, we will never be able to keep up with Vietnam's filthy propaganda game.

#### Old Grievances With LPDR Cited

Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 4 Jun 84 p 5

[Article by Seni Saowaphong: "The Boundary Where Neighborly Relations Begin"]

[Text] Concerning the clash between Thai and Lao forces along the border between Uttaradit Province [in Thailand] and Sayaboury Province in Laos, an article in the 31 May issue of MATICHON expressed the attitude of high-ranking Thai officials, including the prime minister. They have expressed a desire to compromise. That is, they feel that both countries must sit down at the negotiating table and avoid using military force or combat. This view is in line with the actions taken by Thailand in dealing with border problems with neighboring countries ever since the end of the Second World War.

The MATICHON article stated, correctly, that this stems partly from the problems created by colonialism, some of which have never been solved. Changes occurred because of changes in direction of certain rivers. The borders between Thailand and neighboring countries were fixed by the colonialists.

After the neighboring countries gained their independence and took control of the land from the colonial countries, it became clear to all Thais that on the border issue, Thailand had not been treated fairly by the colonial countries even though the border principles in effect in the world were stipulated by the Western countries. For example, concerning deep-water channels and water demarcation lines, in dealing with Thailand, the colonial countries never acted in accord with the principles. But even so, Thailand never thought of using force against the neighboring countries that had taken control from the colonialists in order to gain justice for Thailand. This was because Thailand did not feel that the neighboring countries were responsible for the fact that Thailand had been treated unfairly.



Thailand's attitude has always been that there should be negotiations with the neighboring countries in order to stipulate definite boundaries, which would eliminate misunderstanding between neighboring countries. Because in general, the original borders were not demarcated clearly or definitely. But these efforts by Thailand have not made much progress; Thailand has always had to wait.

This attitude is the correct attitude since it has prevented serious disputes from arising. Some countries in Asia have had border disputes that have led to military action. After a period of fighting, the forces have been withdrawn, leaving the border problem, the cause of the dispute, unsolved.

In the east, when Kampuchea gained its independence from France, the Kampuchean government called on Thailand to guarantee Kampuchea's border. Thailand hesitated to do this since neither country was certain of the exact location of the border. What should have been done was to conduct a new survey and demarcate a definite boundary. Then such a guarantee could have been made. Even in the Phra Vihan case, Thailand abided by the decision of the World Court, which restored peace along the border between the two countries.

Without boasting, it can be said that at present, Thailand has experts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other sectors who have followed the progress made concerning international law, principles and new modes of operation that various countries have used in demarcating land and sea boundaries. Officials from the Armed Forces Survey Department and Royal Thai Navy oceanographic officials have studied and applied new techniques and freely passed on this knowledge to our neighbors in order to demarcate the boundaries fairly. This has been done with friendly intentions. For example, the demarcation of the sea boundary extending out from Ranong Province was completed with Burma.

However, Thailand's neighbors still have internal problems that prevent them from taking action on the land and sea border issues. Thailand will have to be patient until negotiations can be held and a peaceful agreement reached in order to benefit all sides without having to turn to other methods.

Several methods can be used to demarcate the border. The new methods are much more flexible. The border problem as a whole is discussed instead of discussing individual points or areas. Everything is considered together and a new division is made. Consideration is given to the geographical situation and ease of entry and to which side would be better able to develop the area.

However, the border problem is a very complex matter that is difficult to reach an agreement on. This is because the remnants of old values and views are still quite prevalent. For the people, the border is not a line to divide countries but a line to show where neighborly relations begin.

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CSO: 4207/179



THAI BORDER VIOLATORS KILLED

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 28 Jun 84 p 16

[Article]

[Text] A DAO SIAM reporter in Loei Province reported that at 1500 hours on 26 June, at Ban Sangao, Village 4, Huai Phichai Subdistrict, Pak Chom District, Loei Province, just as the villagers there were holding a ceremony inaugurating the new water supply system, everyone was startled by the sound of gunfire coming from the Lao side of the Mekong River. The sound of AK-rifle fire continued for about 10 minutes. All the villagers looked toward where the firing was coming from. Then, Police Sublieutenant Sathien Plieu-om, the deputy inspector at the provincial police station in Pak Chom District, and a group of officials went out to patrol the area and preserve the peace along the Thai-Lao border. They went along the bank of the Mekong River. When they reached Ban Sangao, they received a report from Mr Pranom Phonlahom, the kamnan of Ban Sangao, Village 4. He told them that this had probably happened because seven people from his village had crossed the Mekong River with bird nets in order to catch birds on the Lao side. The seven men were Mr Rin Roikaeo, Mr Pua Phetcharat, Mr Eng Roita, Mr Chom Roita, Mr Phon Klangprapha, Mr So Bunduangdi and Mr Loi (surname unknown). It was thought that they had been shot and killed by Lao soldiers.

Then at 1700 hours the same day, as the villagers were watching all this, they saw five people swimming across the Mekong River to the Thai side. When they reached the bank, it was found that they were members of the group that had gone to catch birds. From questioning those who had managed to return, it was learned that when they had reached the Lao side, they had walked about 10 meters and then encountered 15 Lao soldiers standing in a line. The soldiers were armed with AK rifles. The soldier in charge asked them if they were Thais. They said yes. The Lao soldier in charge then yelled at them to get ready to die. The seven men pleaded for their lives, saying that they had come to catch birds. The Lao soldiers screamed that Thais had already seized three villages and that now they had come to get birds. When they finished talking, they shot and killed Mr Phon and Mr So right in front of the other five Thais. They then ordered the others to swim back to Thailand, reminding them that if they returned, they, too, would be killed.

Furthermore, Mr FonChaidini, the kamnan inspector at Ban Sangao, said that the two men who had been killed were members of the People's Volunteers for Development and Self-Defense and the Volunteer Defense Corps in the village. The bodies of the two men are still on the Lao side. It has not been possible to recover their bodies.

11943

CSO: 4207/168

YAO FLEE TO CHIANG SAEN, RETURNED HOME

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 6 May 84 p 16

[Article: "Two Brothers Arrested for Smuggling In Lao Refugees"]

[Text] A DAO SIAM reporter in Chiang Rai Province reported that at 0500 hours on 5 May, Mr Manit Sakhon, the head of the Ban Saeo Subdistrict Council in Chiang Saen District, Chiang Rai Province, captured 65 Lao refugees who had crossed into the country and two Thais who had been hired to smuggle in these Lao refugees. They had been paid 4,000 baht per refugee. Of these refugees, 32 were men and 33 were women. They were arrested at the Ban Thong Phakham checkpoint in Ban Saeo Subdistrict, Chiang Saen District, Chiang Rai Province.

This was reported to Police Major Samran Makkon, the inspector at the provincial police station in Chiang Saen District, who rushed to the scene of the incident. When he arrived, he questioned the refugees and learned that they were members of the Yao tribe. They had fled from Ban Rong San, "Na Dong" Province, Laos. They had followed the Mekong River and then entered Thailand at Ban Hat Bai in Wiang Subdistrict, Chiang Khong District, Chiang Rai Province. They then cut across to Ban Huai Du, Village 2, Wiang Subdistrict, Chiang Khong District, Chiang Rai Province.

Mr Sulin Saetoen, age 23, and Mr Kaolieu Saetoen, age 20, two Lao refugees who had once lived at the refugee center in Chiang Kham District and who knew a good escape route, wanted this group of refugees to go to Mae Chan District in Chiang Rai Province where they could mix with the Yao tribesmen there. Later on, they could slip into the refugee center.

Mr Lulin and Mr Kaolieu contacted Mr Saiyon Bukhasophi, age 21, and Mr Bunchai Bukhasophi, age 23, two Thai citizens who lived in Chiang Khong District, in order to have them take this group of refugees to Mae Chan District. They were paid 4,000 baht per refugee. These two brothers used two trucks, license numbers Chiang Rai N4110 and N7732, and followed the Ket Yutthasat Highway. When they reached the Ban Thong Phakham checkpoint, officials asked to search the vehicles since they were transporting an unusually large number of people. When they searched the trucks, they learned that these were Lao refugees. Thus, the two Thais were taken into custody for further handling of the case. The Lao refugees will be sent back to Laos.

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
CSO: 4207/168

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BRIBERY AT HIGHWAY INSPECTION STATIONS PREVALENT

Hanoi VAN NGHE in Vietnamese 16 Jun 84 p 11

[Cartoon]



- a. Inspection station
- b. Pass on through
- c. [555] a popular brand of cigarettes in Vietnam

CSO: 4209/376

## ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

### BETTER MANAGEMENT TO SUIT SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS PROPOSED

Hanoi NGHIEN CUU KINH TE in Vietnamese No 2, Apr 84 pp 1-11, 23

[Article by Vu Quoc Tuan: "On Socioeconomic Features of Our Country and Some Methodological Problems of Economic Management"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface or italics]

[Text] To analyze correctly the characteristics of the objects of economic management in each stage, to recognize the many principled evolution processes of these management objects and hence to study methodological problems and provide a scientific basis for socioeconomic leadership and management to determine and establish an economic management mechanism appropriate to the management objects--all that is a task of primary importance to all managerial activities. However, this task is extremely difficult since the realities of economic management in our country have demonstrated that it is impossible to grasp the above-mentioned factors fully and immediately and that a process is absolutely necessary. Whether this process will be long or short depends on our subjective efforts and it is during this process that economic management will become ever more suitable to the economic situation and achieve an ever higher socioeconomic effectiveness.

#### Basic socioeconomic features in the initial stage

We have become increasingly aware of the socioeconomic features of our country during the initial stage of transition to socialism and, through the realities of the situation, we have also seen these features' influence on socioeconomic management together with the attendant advantages and difficulties. What is important is to /examine these features and draw accurate conclusions for application in economic management/ in order to make /this task ever more suitable to our country's economy.

These features can be described as follows:

/First feature/. --The Fourth Party Congress stressed that the greatest characteristic is the fact that our country is advancing from a society with an economy based on a predominantly small-scale production to socialism without going through the capitalist development stage. The Congress resolution added emphatically: "The greatest characteristic of economic management in our country is the fact that we are managing an economy that is advancing from small-scale to socialist large-scale production. Economic management must be aimed at stepping up this process and creating favorable conditions for its rapid development in order soon to create a socialist large-scale production structure in our country." This characteristic shows the nature of the socialist revolutionary process in our country, determines the main theme of this process and sets forth the fundamental guidelines for and the forms and methods of socioeconomic management.



From the economic management point of view, small-scale production has these noteworthy characteristics: /First/, because of a serious shortage of raw materials, supplies, energy, machines and spare parts, the material-technical bases are inadequate and unable to meet reproduction requirements; /second/, the various sectors of national economy are incoherent and not yet combined into a rational structure and are also disproportionate and unable to serve each other: Agriculture does not yet act as a foundation for industry, industry is not yet strong enough to provide technical equipment for agriculture and other sectors of national economy while communications, transportation, information, liaison and, generally speaking, the economic infrastructural composition are insufficient to promote both economic development and management; and, /third/, nearly 90 percent of the work force is still composed of manual laborers whose labor productivity is very low while the population is increasing too rapidly so that each individual can support only slightly more than one person with a very low standard of living; the majority of laborers work in the agriculture field mainly to produce grain but still can only hardly provide enough grain for the society; the various trades and crafts develop weakly and their products are neither abundant nor diversified; because the work force has been distributed very irrationally among various regions, it is impossible to exploit all lands and to develop forestry--a formerly strong sector of our country. Generally speaking, the fundamental peculiarities of small-scale production are the low labor productivity and the low rate of merchandise production. On the other hand, despite the people's very low standard of living, the population has increased rapidly, which has visibly lowered the quality of life, especially in densely populated localities and zones.

What problems are facing economic management as a result of such peculiarities?

Clearly, we are managing an economy in which small-scale production is prevalent while we do not yet possess an economy with a large-scale production as the object of our management. The managing process requires, on the one hand, that managerial measures be applied in conformity with the small-scale production economy and, on the other, that gradual steps be taken to advance this small-scale production economy toward a socialist large-scale production. For this reason, it is necessary to reorganize the economy and to consider it to be the first task in the economic management process from production to distribution, exchange and consumption so as to shape up a new economic structure ever more consistent with our country's characteristics and capable of developing production at a quick pace.

Simultaneously, because of the too low productivity of small-scale production and because of the weak and crippled material-technical bases, special importance must be attached to building material-technical bases for socialism, and socialist industrialization must be considered the central task throughout the transitional period. For economic management, the question is to find the optimum solution to obtain sources of capital accumulation for the economy right within the economic domain and, at the same time, to consider it especially important to manage the population growth, to give jobs to the people and gradually to improve their standard of living.

Also, because the small-scale production economy is in the process of moving toward socialist large-scale production, there must be a versatile, flexible management mechanism to suit each sector and zone in each specific stage while at the same time promoting the advance to socialist large-scale production.

/Second feature/. --The economy is still made up of many components: Three (state, collective and individual) in North Vietnam and five (state, collective, state capitalist, private capitalist and individual) in South Vietnam. Though not an economic component apart from the above-mentioned ones, the household economy is part of the socialist economy, is still occupying an important position and thus must be stimulated and guided. Economic management must be exercised appropriately to each and every economic component and to their changes throughout the transitional period. Following are some specific measures:

First and foremost, as a result of the struggle to settle the "who will vanquish whom," issue between socialism and capitalism, the economic components are evolving continuously in the following trend: The state and collective economies will be further strengthened and developed with each passing day and the state economy will play an increasingly stable role while the private capitalist economy will be continuously restricted and ultimately eliminated and most of the individual economy will be gradually reorganized and transformed into a collective economy. In conformity with this reformatory process along the party line, management must consider socialist transformation to be its important theme and must apply many measures and policies to step up the process of socialist transformation.

On the other hand, transitional economic forms must be devised in planning and management in order fully to use the abilities of all economic components with distinction of each of them and of their interrelationships during each historic period so as to formulate different economic measures and forms.

/Third feature/. --After undergoing many years of war ravage, the small-scale production economy is suffering from a serious imbalance and cannot yet be stabilized. The war aftermath is enormous and manifold: Material destruction and disruption of economy, life, social activities and working patterns (such as excessive bureaucracy in economic management, concept of wartime economic activities regardless of effectiveness, etc.). It can be said that in the past 8 or 9 years, our economy underwent three major disruptions: The first happened in 1975 when both North and South Vietnam suffered a sudden cut of over R-\$ 2 billion in nonredeemable aid; the second took place in 1979 when the Chinese expansionists launched a war of aggression in the northern and southwestern border areas of our country, causing heavy material losses to us, and also cut off aid, depriving us of a large amount of income; the third occurred since 1980 and especially since 1981 when we made a major turn, shifting from basic reliance on aid to self-sufficiency and from importation of relatively large quantities of goods at preferential prices to limited importation at prices many times higher. At present, there is an imbalance in many economic aspects, most conspicuously in the following three: grain and food products; energy and raw materials, and foreign currency. The people's living standard which has

always been low is faced with more difficulties. Many acute social problems have arisen (jobs for laborers, social evils, need for housing, education, therapeutic medicines and so forth); in view of this situation, economic management has to resolve many major problems:

It is first necessary to activate the internal factors of the economic system and instill them with a high spirit of self-sufficiency; to mobilize to the highest degree all potentials of material-technical bases, labor and land and all sources of capital; and to use to the greatest advantage all economic energies and components that are beneficial to socialism while economic management must energetically oppose the wasteful use of all sources of power and all material and intellectual capabilities.

It is simultaneously necessary to see all the terrible disruptions caused by wars so as to concentrate forces on stabilizing the overall situation and hence to work out correct policies on investment, accumulation and consumption.

/Fourth features/. --While the entire country is advancing toward socialism, North and South Vietnam have each their own special traits which have been shaped up throughout history and developed along different lines. We must stress that though national reunification from the governmental point of view constitutes a great political victory, the economy has also been unified but has not yet become really uniform. Everyone knows clearly that after building socialism for 20 years, North Vietnam now possesses a fixed number of material-technical bases for the socialist regime and that its economy has long been managed according to plan. During that time, the former economy of South Vietnam began to develop along the capitalist lines to promote the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression and strategic schemes. Therefore, there are socioeconomic differences bequeathed by history which we must consider and assess objectively and completely. We are stressing this point not to overstate the peculiarities of South Vietnam in order to preclude the socialist economic management method but mainly to find out suitable forms and measures to carry out management according to the socialist method and in conformity with the characteristics of the southern provinces (among which Ho Chi Minh City itself has its own features which we must analyze carefully because we must adopt a suitable attitude and treatment with regard to this city and cannot consider it like any other city or province).

On the one hand, it is necessary to find out certain managerial forms and measures to rapidly overcome the discrepancies between the two regions such as by applying the past valuable managerial experiences of the North in the South and vice versa and by selectively adopting the good points of management in the previous stage, especially of the management of enterprises. In other words, to eliminate discrepancies does not simply mean to arbitrarily apply the outmoded experiences of the North in the southern economy and to consider them completely correct patterns; conversely, it does not either mean to consider all the past enterprise management methods of the South wise, swift and effective and simply to apply them in managing enterprises in the North.



On the other hand, it is necessary to see and consider all the special traits of each region in determining specific management policies and to apply suitable management forms and measures instead of automatically following the same patterns. In this regard, it is also necessary to distinguish enterprises having always applied a modern management method from the newly founded ones and from the transitional forms used in socialistically transforming agriculture, small industry, handicrafts and so on.

/Fifth feature/. --Our country is in time of peace but has to cope with a type of manifold war of aggression waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collusion with U.S. imperialism and has also to get ready to face a large-scale war of aggression possibly to be launched by the enemy. For this reason, coordinating economy with national defense and vice versa is an extremely acute problem. From the economic management point of view, the following tasks must be set forth:

The first necessity is to take care of the economy to promote national defense. In all spheres from planning to the reallocation of labor and population and to the formulation of plan norms, it is necessary to take the requirements of national defense into consideration and closely to combine economy with national defense and vice versa. For all policies on labor, wages, remunerations for work performed, and use of labor, their correlations with national defense must be taken into account.

At the same time, policies and systems must be formulated to mobilize the army and national defense installations to participate in economic construction. The role of national defense forces participating in economic construction in certain regions must be considered very important.

/Sixth feature/. --Our country's economic construction is being conducted amid international circumstances marked by many opportunities, by the support and assistance of the fraternal socialist countries in the CEMA and by the cooperation with Laos and Kampuchea but is also faced with difficulties created to our foreign economic relations by the "embargo" and sabotage policy of the U.S. imperialists and Beijing ruling clique. From the managerial point of view, we need to realize clearly both the opportunities and difficulties, to skillfully exploit the favorable conditions, to make the most of the potentials created by foreign relationships and simultaneously to restrict unfavorable factors.

We must take appropriate managerial measures to broaden our economic relations with foreign countries and to use the world's scientific-technical innovations to the best advantage to promote our national economic construction. Diversifying economic relationships and varying their forms is also a measure aimed at positively and actively countering the enemy's blockade and embargo policy.

/Seventh feature/. --Another equally important feature requiring our attention in the management process is the characteristics of the Vietnamese small producers with their economic views, their method of doing jobs in a scattered, casual and unilateral manner and especially their disregard for productivity,

quality and effectiveness; these habits have become ingrained in their thinking pattern and life style and thus can hardly be changed in a short period of time. Moreover, these habits constitute the concepts, working manners and low scientific-technical standard of both the laborers and managerial cadres--that is, of both the subjective and objective side of management.

In exercising management, we must, therefore, pay special attention to training and improving laborers into workers in a large-scale production system who work with discipline and technique, who have a high productivity corresponding to the economic construction demand and who can act as owners in managing installations, production and business according to the socialist large-scale production method.

Moreover, it is necessary to train and improve managerial cadres to meet requirements of the socialist large-scale production method. Experiences have shown that a given management method requires a corresponding body of management cadres and that it is impossible to advance the economy from small-scale to socialist large-scale production by employing cadres entrenched in their habit of doing business in a scattered, free, casual and petty manner proper to small producers. Especially important is the need to imbue their economic concepts from thought to action with the [socialist] economic standpoint--that is, the socialist large-scale production and business management method which consists in continuously keeping abreast of the actual situation, in drawing valuable experiences from the variegated and lively aspects of life for the management benefit and in severely criticizing and eliminating the tendency to dogmatism and blind imitation as well as the failure to promptly grasp the novelties of life.

Foregoing are merely incipient thoughts about the fundamental socioeconomic features of our country--ones which must be considered important in researching managerial solutions. We can say that these features represent the departure level of our country's economy in its shift to socialist large-scale production/. The understanding of these features really involves a process from shallowness to deepness and from one-sidedness to comprehensiveness but the sooner they are understood, the sooner it will be possible to find a suitable solution and avoid mistakes. Moreover, because the above-mentioned features are also situated during the /evolution process/, it is essential to keep track of the situation developments and promptly to supplement this understanding with new ideas and provide a new solution once the situation has changed.

Concerning these features, we find it necessary to emphasize three aspects-- /small-scale production, presence of many components/ and a serious /imbalance at the present time/--of which small-scale production is the greatest characteristic that is influencing very deeply our country's economy in the first stage of transition to socialism. On the basis of such a departure point, it is essential to indicate the various stages of economic construction as well as the mission and theme of economic management in accordance with each phase. In this respect, the closest relationships are emerging between the economic line and strategy and the economic management strategy. Once a certain economic mission is indicated, economic management must turn toward this mission and determine its own specific steps, forms and measures. Conversely, the



formulation of any economic mission cannot be dissociated from the actual capabilities of management, especially of the managerial cadres, because if a great economic mission is set forth while the managerial capabilities are below par, a situation will arise where it will be impossible to carry out this economic mission and achieve the expected economic target.

It follows that a full and profound knowledge of specific economic features is always a primary basis for economic management--an extremely important kind of basis for the formulation of a managerial strategy, which means also the application of the system of laws--economic, natural and social--in accordance with the objects of management.

/Some methodological problems of economic management in our country in the present stage/

The problem facing economic management in our country at the present time is--on the basis of an adequate and correct understanding of the economic features, actual socioeconomic situation and system of economic laws operative during the management process and also through the application of a knowledge about the socialist economic management science--to set up a suitable economic management system capable of taking our country's economy from small-scale to socialist large-scale production. The Fifth Party Congress pointed out the following basic guideline to build the [economic] management mechanism: "Our country's economy is now made up of many components with different technical standards, scopes of action and forms of production and is being afflicted with serious imbalance in many respects. To suit this economy, there must be a dynamic management mechanism capable of abolishing bureaucratic centralism, sluggish conservatism and widespread pluralism and properly implementing the principle of democratic centralism."\* What must be stressed here is our need to gradually build a /socialist/ economic management mechanism--one which is /dynamic/ and consistent with the peculiarities of a very complex and multiform economy in the process of moving forward. To do so is also to apply an appropriate historic viewpoint in managing the economy. It is unwise to apply the economic management forms and methods of any highly developed country in our country's economy in the present stage as well as in any phase of the development process for the simple reason that in each different stage, each country's economy develops according to both the general laws and its own special ones together with its specific socioeconomic characteristics. Consequently, in the present initial stage when the economy is still made up of many components and is being subjected to tremendous changes, it is all the more impossible to apply a rigidly patterned managerial mechanism automatically and uniformly to all objects of management of different kinds and forms. This requires not only the elimination of the obsolete, bookish concept but also a painstaking research to find suitable managerial forms and measures. To evaluate any

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#### FOOTNOTE

\* Document of the Fifth National Congress of Delegates, Su That Publishing House, 1982, Volume II, Page 72.

managerial solution and ascertain that it is suitable or inappropriate, the /final yardstick/ is its socioeconomic effect including productivity, quality, efficiency, improvement in the laborers' material life and continuous development of a civilized and wholesome lifestyle.

From the realities of economic management in our country in the past years, the following points can be elicited and considered to be the /demands placed on the economic management mechanism/ in our country in the present stage:

1. Management must guarantee the fulfillment of the socioeconomic targets set by the Party. It is generally said that the targets express the desire of the objects of management. Though reflecting the requirements of objective economic laws and the specific features in each given historic stage, targets are also things that can be perceived and conceived by man so that they are of both an objective nature and a subjective significance. The more correctly the objective necessity is understood by man, the more appropriate and attainable the targets set by him will be. This is the reverse correlation between the objective nature of the management targets and the standards of managerial cadres. From the history of socialist economic construction in our country, we have drawn many experiences in setting targets--common targets of the national economy and of each sector, locality or installation; targets for periods of 5 and 1 year or for shorter ones; socioeconomic, scientific and technical targets, etc... The art of setting correct targets requires us to consider very carefully all subjective and objective conditions together with the situation at home and abroad and also to calculate the real managerial capabilities in order to insure the attainment of targets. Experiences have also demonstrated that setting unrealistic targets has led to much wastefulness and many-sided consequences. There have also been cases of fulfillment and even overfulfillment of targets under favorable conditions due mainly to the progressive efforts of managers, to their creative and dynamic working methods and to their refusal to remain helpless in the face of difficulties. In this connection, it is important to emphasize both aspects: Management must guarantee the fulfillment of targets and, conversely, the setting of targets must fully examine the capabilities of management. Management must be renovated to insure the fulfillment at all costs of the 4 comprehensive socioeconomic targets and 10 major socioeconomic policies set forth by the Fifth Party Congress.

2. Management must have the effect of mobilizing and organizing all capabilities into a combined strength to attain the economic targets and also of turning potentials into realities and transforming real possibilities into practical action by the laboring people. As said above, it is primarily important to set correct targets and, through the medium of the managerial task, to mobilize all capabilities to attain these targets. As repeatedly pointed out by our Party, our country now has great possibilities concerning labor (including the technical and educated work force), land, natural resources, material-technical bases and material supplies which are existing but not yet fully used, foreign economic relationships (with great export potentials for tropical agricultural products) and also concerning the contingent of cadres. Generally speaking, these possibilities including those within our reach have not yet been duly exploited mainly because of the [ineffective] management from the drawing up of plans to the

formulation of policies and the organization of their execution. In practice, the localities and installations having made new progress in production and construction are precisely those which have taken action on the managerial task and which have boldly renovated their working method and made it dynamic and creative. Bearing in mind this important meaning of management, we can say that to bring about a change in the situation and successfully to fulfill the socioeconomic targets, we have to consider two principal and especially important types of factors relating to the economic management mechanism and to the intensification of the scientific-technical revolution. All things considered, in both these factors, the development of the latter's effect will depend on whether the economic management mechanism is renovated superficially or profoundly and quickly or slowly. Therefore, to mobilize all capabilities to build the economy, it is essential, on the one hand, to renovate economic management and, on the other, to ensure that this renovation entails the mobilization and organization of all possibilities without exception of any one no matter whether it is light and whether it will have some effect only within a small scope or a short period of time.

Concerning the economic relations with foreign countries, according to the Party viewpoint, we must broaden and strengthen our overall cooperation with the Soviet Union, expand our cooperation with other CEMA countries along the lines of socialist economic alliance, widen our overall cooperation with Laos and Kampuchea and simultaneously avoid neglecting the multiform development of economic relations with countries outside the socialist camp. This necessitates a very quick development of sources of export goods while exportation must be considered to be a strategic task alongside the expansion of tourism, servicing activities, the catering for seaships, exchange transactions for overseas Vietnamese [kieuu hoois] and so forth to collect more foreign currencies. Is it true that we may use diverse and multifaceted forms of cooperation such as contract ordering of goods, bilateral or multilateral business alliances and short- or long-term loans, etc., and, through these measures, acquire the maximum technique and capital and take advantage of our strength in labor, land and natural resources? In this respect, the managerial art is also one of attracting outside potentials and using them to the best advantage to supplement domestic capabilities and create conditions to step up economic development.

3. Management must try to combine all social production factors and create specific, harmonious relationships with a view to achieving the socioeconomic targets in each definite period of time. But in response to what demand and according to what method must such a combination be effected? Experiences have shown clearly the need to apply different methods and forms--including transitional forms suitable for an economy in which small-scale production is still prevalent and which is still made up of many economic components--and to do so with enough versatility and flexibility to create a new influence and strength at all levels, in all sectors and throughout the national economy. Within the scope of national economy, there are very important relationships of coordination such as those between industry and agriculture, central and local level, accumulation and consumption, domestic and foreign affairs, economy and national defense, etc. .



Within the scope of a production installation, these relationships are specific factors of the reproduction process. The methods and forms used must be diverse and multifaceted and appropriate to the specific characteristics of the objects of management in each fixed period of time. What must be stressed is the need to coordinate these factors most closely to create a new strength.

The coordination of these factors of social production must be reflected in the economic structure and in the production orientation of the national economy as well as in each sector, locality and installation. Therefore, determining a sound economic structure must be the primary task of management and also the "basic theme of economic planning."

4. Management must be able to comprehensively apply various laws--economic, natural and social--, especially the economic ones. In this respect, a highly important experience has been drawn from the shift effected over the past few years from an excessively bureaucratic administrative management method to one conformable to economic laws. To our knowledge, economic laws will exercise their effect through the self-conscious activities of man when he gets to know them and uses them in a way beneficial to socialism. The application of economic laws must be aimed at creating an economic motive to vigorously push all collectives and individuals to make every effort to perform labor and carry out tasks to attain the productivity, quality and efficiency targets for the sake of unifying the three economic interests. Experiences have demonstrated clearly that if due attention is paid to the interests of individual laborers and especially to linking their income with the end product of their work so as to enable them to control their own jobs by examining the volume and quality of their own products, a very great effect will be felt which will urge them to work enthusiastically, to exploit all the real capabilities of their own units and to produce more wealth.

5. Management must try to develop to the maximum the aggregate strength of the socialist collective ownership system and to stir up a seething and strong mass movement to carry out socioeconomic tasks. The laboring people are both the subject and object of management. After all, to manage the national economy is to manage human beings. The socialist system is one with sufficient capabilities and conditions to liberate man most thoroughly as repeatedly pointed out by our Party, and to materialize the laboring people's right to collective ownership. Experiences have demonstrated clearly that man is immensely dynamic and that, once he has been liberated, it will be impossible to anticipate his resilience and the productivity peaks likely to be attained by him. Toward this end, emphasis must be laid on the need to pay sufficient attention to meeting the material and cultural requirements of man in performing productive labor, taking rest, living with his family and amid the community, etc. . A knowledge of psychology must be applied during the management process. We must not only grasp economic laws, production industry regulations and managerial methods but must also know how to educate cadres, workers and all laborers into self-conscientious and well-disciplined people with high labor productivity, quality and effectiveness;

at the same time, care must be taken of human interrelationships by creating working collectives with a friendly and relaxed atmosphere filled with the "each for all, all for each" spirit.

In our opinion, the above-mentioned points are the requirements of an effective management mechanism which have been distilled from the economic management realities in our countries in the recent past. These points require that we comprehensively and systematically think over economic management as a whole--from its various parts to every small field in each such part (classification and systematization)--and that we form a new thinking system over the economic management mechanism. It is in this sense that one usually calls management a science and also an art. As long as one's thinking system develops, one will find more measures and forms which will prove creative and effective--that is, ever more suitable for the objects of management.

Following are some suggestions about /certain methodological points on economic management/ based on the peculiarities of our country's economy in the first stage of the transitional period.

/1. Correct application of the democratic centralist principle/.- Democratic centralism is a fundamental principle of socialist economic management. The central-level state must exercise a uniform centralist management throughout the country to insure fulfillment of the common goals of socialist construction and of the fatherland's defense. This is one of the superiorities of socialism. By holding the political and economic power and by controlling the most important material-technical bases and the imported strategic materials. . . , the proletarian dictatorial state has sufficient political and economic conditions to exercise a uniform centralist management of the national economy. Using plans as principal tools in conjunction with other instruments including policies, measures and even laws, our state gathers together all sources of material forces and moral strength to implement the common line and the Party economic line with the aim of gradually building up a rational economic structure to fulfill the socioeconomic goals and policies of the Party. Without the state's centralist management, it will be impossible to attain the goals of socialist construction. It must be noted that the centralist management of national economic development must first be exercised by means of economic lines, projects, plans and policies and more specifically through the centralist allocation of various means and material supplies, labor, capital and so on to the most important key targets of economic construction and national defense consolidation.

Because of their very nature, some functions can be assumed only by the central level and cannot under any condition whatever be transferred to localities and installations. In fulfilling these extremely important functions, the state will formulate adequate rights to take the initiative and to work creatively and will vest them in the localities and installations. On this basis and with regard to the common goals, basic means and complete and rational overall systems and policies, whenever the central level does not handle any affair, the installations will, in principle, have the right to make a decision, especially in choosing the procedures, forms and methods conformable to



their specific local conditions and conducive to the development of their local strength. The measures and forms which the localities are allowed by the central level to look for and apply are aimed at fully using the sources of labor, land and natural resources to vigorously develop their local economy for the benefit of the localities and installations and ultimately to contribute ever more to meeting the entire country's needs and promoting nationwide socialist construction. In this connection, it is quite out of the question for us to say that democratic development will entail the loss of centralism or the exercise of centralism will lead to the loss of democracy according to the belief that "centralism and democracy are two antagonistic aspects of a unified contradiction." For our country still with its small-scale, scattered and incoherent production and with its numerous economic components, economic management decentralization proves all the more necessary because it is as essential as the initial stage. Since the objects of management are complex, there must be a corresponding degree of complexity on the part of management and management must be exercised through many levels, each with its own function, mission and power to solve itself the problems arising within its scope of action. To say so means also to overcome bureaucratic centralism--the cause of constraints and of limited development of the localities' and installations' potentials--and correctly to implement the principle that all the three levels jointly exercise the right of collective ownership and are owners at all the three levels.

It must be stressed that our economic potentials are still very great and that there are real possibilities within our reach primarily in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fishing, small industry and handicrafts, etc. . The present question is whether to decentralize management more vigorously and hand it over to the localities and installations, to strongly develop the installations' right to take the initiative in planning and to broaden their financial independence in order to allow every locality and installation to fully exploit all potentials and, on this basis, to enable the central level to concentrate enough sources of accumulation to promote socialist industrialization. Realities have demonstrated clearly that there can be no concentration without accumulation; that the quicker the accumulation, the greater the concentration; that there can be no accumulation without great concentration and that the greater the concentration, the more conditions there will be to broaden accumulation. This is at present a problem to be solved in the relationships between the central and local level. The objective realities are calling for an urgent removal of ties and restrictions and for a development of the localities' and installations' ability to take the initiative in production and business. In view of the present economic situation of our country, the centralization of production and management organization on too large scales as well as the concentration of too many governing rights on the central level without reserving any motility for the localities and installations will surely limit initiatives, create a psychology of reliance and expectancy and restrict the exploitation of potentials.

At present, economic management decentralization in our country is actually a matter of reorganizing work assignment and cooperation among various sectors and localities in their production and business activities and does not at all mean a "sharing of wealth, rights and interests;" therefore, it must be implemented in all aspects of economic, production and business management including economic

structure, production organization, planning, use of economic stimuli and organization of the managerial mechanism. Decentralizing management means also closely associating responsibilities and rights with interests and obligations. Each local level and sector has its own power and interests along with its responsibilities and obligations to the central level.

Our Party has indicated that economic equilibrium must be based on "four sources of possibilities" (on-the-spot, through economic alliance and import-export, and supply by the high level); this is also a way to achieve equilibrium from low to high echelons and to carry out decentralization for harmonious planning in order to enable each level to act as real owner in exploiting its own potentials. If this is done, there will be a more stable balance in the plans of the high level and the state.

/2. Use of plans as principle tools and coordination of plans with economic accounting and socialist business/.- In the socialist economic management, the use of plans as principal tools has almost become a natural, irrefutable reason. But the problem during the initial transitional stage is that the plans' scope and the planning level can be expanded only in proportion to the development of the production forces and relationships. If so, during this stage, how to resolve the correlations between the use of plans as tools and the use of the merchandise-currency and market relationships? And what must be done to ensure that the plans themselves deeply reflect the economic accounting and socialist business principle or, in other words, that they correctly imply the use of the merchandise-currency and market relationships?

Emphasis must be laid first on the necessity of consolidating and strengthening the role and effectiveness of plans--the principal tools of the proletarian dictatorial state in economic management. We must admit that the actual effectiveness of plans is now still low and that plans are not yet the real center of the socioeconomic management mechanism. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that plans correctly express the party line, that they are formulated and compiled from the grassroots and district levels upward, that they are symmetrical and simultaneously positive and realistic, that they will help exploit economic potentials to the fullest, that they are based on scientific foundations and so forth. The major issue here is for the various levels to act as owners of the plans. Economic management must be decentralized satisfactorily to allow each level to act as the real owner of its plan; only by doing so can we fully exploit the localities' and installations' potentials and ensure the state plan's stability.

But we are planning an economy which is advancing from small-scale production of goods to socialist large-scale production--that is, a socioeconomic structure still based on merchandise production. It is thus absolutely impossible to ignore the basic concepts about the production of goods even though these goods are socialist ones. The fact that we consider the use value primarily important is not a reason for neglecting the value of goods themselves. To overcome excessive bureaucracy in planning, it is necessary to associate plans with economic accounting and socialist business or, in other words, carefully to

calculate all production and business expenditures and to compare them to the income with the aim of continuously and rapidly increasing the society's products and especially the national income and accumulating wealth ever more quickly to expand reproduction. The plan of each basic installation, locality or sector must be the product of many other plans the most effective of which must be picked out; in other words, /the plan itself must be effective/ so that it is necessary to ponder and find out what product must be manufactured, what crop must be grown and what animal species must be raised to achieve the highest effect and what project must be built to obtain the most realistic result and so forth. Each plan must have the nature of an "account statement" designed to continuously reducing the labor, material and capital expenditures. This is a problem to be raised seriously for economic management and planning in a country characterized by a small-scale production and a serious shortage of raw materials and supplies. . . . Clearly, to do so is also to implement in a planned manner the merchandise-currency relationships and the basic concepts of value in drawing up plans. The important role of planning is precisely to reckon the loss of social labor, to distribute the society's gross production and to provide an economic stimulus for production. In applying the merchandise-currency relationships, there usually have appeared two tendencies: Either to draw up a production plan without carefully calculating the production cost, without comparing losses to profit and without caring for the waste of labor, materials and capital and to disregard economic accounting--or to automatically calculate dear and cheap prices and profit and losses, which will result in limiting production and the use of labor, land, machines and equipment and will finally lead to the failure to meet the demand.

Under the socialist regime, the market still exists because merchandise is a form still used to carry out exchange activities, because values and prices are 'still employed to calculate production expenditures and to determine the laborers' obligations and interests and because the monetary effect on daily life is still recognized. In formulating and implementing plans, it is essential to pay attention to the use of market relationships. In this connection, there are two factors worth mentioning:

/First/, in drawing up a plan, it is necessary to research markets (including the production means market, consumer goods market, domestic and foreign markets...) and to take into account the society's needs for products of all kinds (requirements of production, daily life, national defense, domestic consumption and export); the plan must be worked out by ensuring equilibrium between the market demands and the production capacities.

/Second/, the market must be used as an integral part of the economic management mechanism; while firmly implementing plans, it is necessary to use them as the central tools of economic management, to employ the market relationships to meet the society's multiform needs which cannot be completely envisaged in the plans and also to let the market readjust itself. By saying so, we mean that it is necessary to allow the market to readjust itself within a definite and secondary limit rather than neglect the plans and follow in the free market's wake or fall into the so-called "marketing socialism," which is completely wrong. This means



only the recognition of an objective necessity: During the current stage, the control sphere through legally compulsory norms (direct planning) is still limited because the economy is still based on small-scale production, because the level of economic socialization is still low and because there still remain many economic components; it is, therefore, necessary to employ /indirect planning/ forms--that is, by means of economic, administrative and legal tools and incentive policies and through the market relationships--to exercise an effect on the production, distribution and circulation processes and to lead these processes /into the orbit of the state plan/. Thus, the market itself must also be planned by taking direct or indirect measures according to each type of market (organized or unorganized). Past experiences have shown clearly that because of the existence of a deeply rooted pattern of excessively bureaucratic and administrative management, it will be very difficult to adopt a management method based on laws and to skillfully apply various laws, especially those of a diversely moving market which are very hard and complex to grasp and implement. Therefore, the use of indirect planning forms requires an operational art involving a firm adherence to fundamental principles and also the need to keep abreast of the everchanging and multifaceted realities without following the free market's tendency to develop spontaneously and without acting rigidly as automatons, which will only result in limiting production development. In view of our present situation, it must be stressed that with the continued existence of many economic components during the initial stage, the struggle between the two roads--socialist and capitalist--is still fierce so that the use of the market must constantly be associated with /its transformation and management/ . . .

/3. Maintenance of uniformity among all economic interests/.-- This is a highly important methodological guideline to ensure the effectiveness of the economic management mechanism. After all, promoting the laborers' happiness and ensuring their material and moral interests is precisely the highest goal of economic management.

We are stressing the overall material and moral development of man and not only the sheer and simple search for economic benefit. It must be noted that during the initial stage of the transitional period, there still remain many kinds of economic interests which are being examined and resolved satisfactorily and which are mainly of three types (those of the entire society, of the collective and of the individual laborers). Though uniform in many respects, economic interests are contradictory in other aspects. An economic management mechanism proper to the present initial stage must be one capable of maintaining the uniformity of all economic interests.

A concentrated illustration of the economic interests' uniformity is to be found in the socioeconomic plans (of the whole country and of each sector, locality and installation). It is not that the plan of any level or unit must guarantee the interests of only such level or unit but that it must reflect the uniformity of all kinds of economic interests--that is, express clearly the concept that all levels are jointly socialist collective owners. It is thus obviously necessary that the ownership and formulation of plans at all levels be exercised and carried out from the grassroots on up. The plans must embody the clever application of economic

incentive policies and involve the obligations, responsibilities, power and interests of each labor collective and individual laborer.

Together with the plans, the system of economic stimuli is also highly effective in maintaining the uniformity of all economic interests. Prices, wages, rewards, product contracts and compensation according to products must also be worked out in a spirit of correctly resolving the interest relationships between the state and the peasants, manual and office workers and other laborers in order to focus the enthusiasm of each and every laborer on the fulfillment of the country's socioeconomic targets.

Of course, the various kinds of economic interests must be classified and graded. The interests of the entire society play the leading role and must be ranked first but the individual laborer's interests must not be neglected either. The collective interests differentiate the socialist collective from the guilds' and associations' collective. During each given stage, it is necessary to properly adjust the relationships between all these types of interests, to specifically distinguish each economic sector and domain and to ensure the uniformity and harmony of all kinds of interests and, at the same time, the reciprocal relationships among all sectors and domains.

/4. Use of diverse, versatile management forms and measures/, especially the transitional economic forms. This is also the application of appropriate laws on economic management. Specifically, any economic form must illustrate the application of economic laws under specific conditions of space and time in accordance with each type of management object. The evolution of economic laws requires the use of corresponding economic forms. The application of economic laws must reflect the nature of production relationships linked with production forces and must be incorporated in the Party line. The implementation of the Party line must manifest the evolution of economic laws in the actual situation and must necessarily go through specific economic forms such as those used for organizing production and management, organizing and assigning labor, supplying materials, doing business, paying wages to laborers, etc. . These are the specific forms and systems of economic management including production organization, planning, incentive policies, organization of the managerial apparatus and so on. In the first stage, the economic structure is still very complex and has many facets, scales, components and technical and managerial standards; if we simply and uniformly apply any managerial model and definite system, method, measure and policy, the result will surely be an increasing monotony in the economic process, a failure to exploit all potentials and even the emergence of obstacles to the development of new economic abilities. Naturally, the versatility and diversity of economic forms and specific measures must not fail to observe the principles of socialist economic management and to follow the standards set by law.

A dynamic economic management mechanism will thus include many different forms of management and production organization: large-, medium- and small-scale enterprises, combined enterprises, local, regional and nationwide federations of enterprises and so on. Diversified forms may be used to establish economic



alliances among various installations and localities, between the central and local economic installations and between state-operated and collective and household installations... by applying the relationships of rational assignment and cooperation. Cooperation with foreign countries may take the forms of contract ordering of goods, joint enterprise, credit and so forth. Moreover, there must be many methods of calculating and formulating plans and a system of standards and charts suitable for each type of installations and enterprises which belong to the same sector but are at different management levels or have different managerial requirements (for example, enterprises specialized in producing export goods may have priority policies and systems and planning apparatuses designed to strongly develop the right of these enterprises and their directors to take the initiative and so forth).

The use of manifold economic forms will better suit the need to fully use the capabilities of all economic components in the transitional period and will link together the transformation and use processes in the sense that the use is aimed at transforming and that the transformation must take place even within the managerial systems and policies. There are the forms of transitional economy, of gradual transformation and of management as well. In the industrial field, we have such forms as joint state-private enterprises, joint ventures, business alliances, production cooperation teams and so on. In the agricultural field, there are such forms as solidarity teams and production collectives and other forms of coordinating the state, collective and individual families to grow industrial crops (including even tea, coffee and rubber trees) and to carry out animal husbandry, etc.. Among the various economic forms applied to use all economic components during the first stage, there may remain nonsocialist and small-scale production factors and it will still be necessary to carry out commercial accounting even in state enterprises; worse still, there may remain exploiting factors to some extent. This state of affairs may be acceptable provided that these economic forms meet one of the requirements of production and business development which is to rapidly increase the amount of products for the society's benefit and especially to fully use labor, land, various sectors and trades and the capital of all strata. It is just in the process of employing such economic forms that the nonsocialist economic components will be reformed gradually; consequently, the nonsocialist factors within various economic forms will be repelled and geared toward high-level economic forms--the completely socialist ones. A principled problem in using the transitional economic forms is to place them within the relationships with the state economy and under the guidance and management of the proletarian dictatorial state.

Realities in our country have demonstrated clearly that the search for economic forms consistent with its economy in the initial stage is a very difficult and complex task. For this reason, it is possible, in many cases, to achieve an identity of views on the overall orientation and standpoint but very hard to determine specific economic forms, policies, systems and measures--in other words, the specific mechanisms of economic management. Actually, the economic forms must illustrate the economic laws operating simultaneously under the specific conditions of production relationships and forces--conditions which differ greatly among various localities with different development levels and different characteristics. Moreover, the search for economic forms depends in a large

measure on the standard of knowledge and scientific thinking pattern of managerial cadres; in practice, an inadequate knowledge and an obsolete and simplistic concept of socialism and large-scale production have usually made it difficult to accept transitional, intermediary economic forms. The conservative nature of obsolete economic forms and the insensitive, bureaucratic, unrealistic and perfunctory working manners of managerial cadres and so forth have also seriously hampered the search for new economic management forms appropriate to our country's economy in each historic stage. Therefore, finding out and employing dynamic and variegated economic forms suitable for the economy is also a protracted and complex struggle in conjunction with the process of determining and establishing a new management mechanism. This also requires a firm grasp of the Marxist-Leninist principles, the application of theories in our country's realities and especially a firm adherence to the economic evolution process and to the laws governing its implementation, for it is precisely through the realities that we can further enrich the economic management science.

9332

CSO: 4209/353

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

SHODDY QUALITY TOLERATED TO MEET PRODUCTION QUOTA

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 28 Jun 84 p 8

[Cartoon]



a. Graph shows that brick enterprise is exceeding planned quota

[caption: Let's speed it up so that we can meet the planned quota]

CSO: 4209/376

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

DOUBLE COUNTING PRACTICED TO MEET QUOTAS

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 28 Jun 84 p 8

[Cartoon]



a. Warehouse

b. Office of the Director

[caption: Could your enterprise temporarily loan my enterprise some of your products so that we can meet the ministry's plan?]

CSO: 4209/376

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

QUOTAS MANIPULATED TO AGREE WITH PRODUCTION

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 28 Jun 84 p 8

[Cartoon]



a. Director

b. Chief of Planning Board

[caption: In the end our corporation managed to meet the plan]

CSO: 4209/376



## BIOGRAPHIC

### INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Nguyễn Mạnh Ái [NGUYEENX MANHJ AIS]

Chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Committee, Haiphong; on 2 July 1984 he attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Nguyễn Nãng An [NGUYEENX NAWNG AN], Doctor

\*Head of the Hanoi College of Medicine; he was mentioned in an article about his school. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 4)

Phan Anh [PHAN ANH]

Chairman of the Vietnam Committee for the Defense of World Peace; on 30 June 1984 he attended a conference of Vietnamese peace, friendship and solidarity association. (NHAN DAN 2 Jul 84 p 1)

Phan Anh [PHAN ANH], lawyer

Vice Chairman of the National Assembly; on 29 June 1984 he attended a government bond exhibit. (NHAN DAN 30 Jun 84 p 4)

Cao Văn Bảo [CAO VAWN BAOR], \*Colonel

\*Deputy Head of the Militia and Self Defense Forces Bureau, 5th Military Region; his article on militia and self defense forces training appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 3)

Ta Hữu Canh [TAJ HUWUX CANH]

Head of the Soviet Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in April or May 1984 he spoke at the Vietnam Socialist Party Club on the economy and society of the USSR in 1983. (TO QUOC Jun 84 p 33)

Trần Huy Chương [TRAANF HUY CHUWOWNG]

Head of Asia Department 3, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in April or May 1984 he spoke at the Vietnam Socialist Party Club on Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's visits to Indonesia and Australia. (TO QUOC Jun 84 p 33)

Phạm Dân [PHAMJ ZAAAN]

Deputy Director General of the Vietnam News Agency; on 29 June 1984 he attended a government bond exhibit. (NHAN DAN 30 Jun 84 p 4)

Trần Văn Danh [TRAANF VAWN ZANH]

Vice Chairman of the Peoples' Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 23 June 1984 he attended the return to the SRV of members of the Vietnam Volunteer Forces in Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Dân [NGUYEENX DAANF]

\*Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Haiphong; Chairman of the People's Committee, Haiphong; on 2 July 1984 he attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Hồ Đắc Dị [HOOF DAWCS ZI], deceased

Born in 1900; Member of the 2nd through 5th National Assemblies; Member of the Standing Committee of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th National Assembly; former Head of the Hanoi Medical College; former Director General for Vietnamese College Affairs; former Director of the Higher and Vocational Education Department; former Member of the State Science and Technology Commission; former Chairman of the Vietnam-France Friendship Association; Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; President of the Vietnam General Association of Medicine; Professor at the Hanoi College of Medicine; he died following an illness on 25 June 1984. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 1)

Lê Văn Duyên [LEE VAWN ZUYEEN]

\*Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Ha Bac Province; recently he attended activities marking the 55th anniversary of the Vietnam Trade Union Federation. (LAO DONG 12 Jul 84 p 2)

Hà Quang Dự [HAF QUANG ZUWJ]

Second Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; on 22 June 1984 he headed a youth delegation to participate in a youth rally in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. (NHAN DAN 23 Jun 84 p 1)

Hồ Dường [HOOF ZUOWNGX]

\*Deputy Editor-in-chief of the CPV daily newspaper NHAN DAN; recently he attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 4)

Nguyễn Bái [NGUYEENX DAIF], \*Colonel

Commander of the SRV volunteer forces rotating from Kampuchea; on 23 June 1984 he thanked the government and people of Kampuchea for the friendship and hospitality they had shown the SRV volunteer forces in Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 25 Jun 84 p 1)

Lương Công Đoàn [LUWOWNG COONG DOAN]

Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; on 27-30 June 1984 he attended a youth union conference in Ho Chi Minh City. (TIEN PHONG 10-16 Jul 84 p 2)

Hoàng Minh Giáp [HOANGF MINH GIAPS]

Deputy Secretary General of the Vietnam Socialist Party; on 30 June 1984 he attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Nguyễn Văn Giáp [NGUYEENX VAWN GIAPS], \*Lieutenant Colonel

\*Commander of the 2nd Dong Thap Regiment; he was mentioned in an article about economic construction activities in Long An Province. (TIEN PHONG 26 Jun-2 Jul 84 p 3)

Trần Văn Hà [TRAANF VAWN HAF]

Standing Member of the Science, Technology and Training Council of the Ministry of Agriculture; his article "Studying the New Doctrine of Comprehensive Rural Development" appeared in the cited source. (TO QUOC Jun 84 p 39)

Trần Quốc Hoàn [TRAANF QUOOC HOANF]

Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; Head of the Civil Proselytizing Department of the CPV Central Committee; recently he chaired a conference on the role of the masses in the northern border provinces. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Jun 84 p 1)

Hà Thiêt Hùng [HAF THIEETS HUNGF]

Alternate Member of the CPV Central Committee; Secretary of the CPV Committee, Hoang Lien Son Province; recently he spoke at a conference on the role of the masses in the northern border provinces. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Jun 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Thái Hùng [NGUYEENX THAIS HUNGF]

\*Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, Cao Bang Province; he was mentioned in an article on the Tinh Tuc Tin Mine. (LAO DONG 5 Jul 84 p 3)

Phan Thế Hùng [PHAN THEES HUNGF]

\*Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; on 3 July 1984 he attended a rally in Hanoi to recruit coal miners. (TIEN PHONG 10-16 Jul 84 p 2)

Nguyễn Như Kim [NGUYEENX NHUW KIM]

\*Head of the Central Science and Technology Information Center; on 22 June 1984 he attended the inaugural of an experiment in remote accessing by satellite of science and technology information between Hanoi and Moscow. (NHAN DAN 25 Jun 84 p 4)

Nguyễn Lam [NGUYEENX LAM]

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV; recently he attended the return to Hanoi of the SRV delegation to the CEMA conference in Moscow. (NHAN DAN 24 Jun 84 p 4)

Đặng Văn Lân [DAWNGJ VAWN LAAN]

Vice Minister of Food; recently he attended an emulation rally of food and transportation workers in Hanoi. (LAO DONG 28 Jun 84 p 2)

Vũ Kỳ Lân [VUX KYF LAAN], \*Colonel

In April or May 1984 he spoke to gatherings in Hanoi, Nam Dinh and Haiphong on the significance of Vietnam's victories over its various enemies. (TO QUOC Jun 84 p 33)

Bùi Tử Liêm [BUIF TUWR LIEEM]

Head of the Sporting Events Department, Physical Education and Sports General Department; on 18 June 1984 he attended the opening ceremony of a marksmanship competition. (THE DUC THE THAO 30 Jun 84 p 1)

Lê Mai [LEE MAI]

\*Vice President of the Vietnam-Sweden Friendship Association; on 20 June 1984 he participated in activities marking the anniversary of the founding of the association. (NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 4)

Nguyễn Bắc Mao [NGUYEENX DAWCS MAOJ]

Deputy Head of Asia Department 4, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on 1 July 1984 he was present when Council of Ministers Chairman Pham Van Dong received an Indian Foreign Ministry delegation. (NHAN DAN 2 Jul 84 p 1)

Hoàng Trường Minh [HOANGF TRUWOWNGF MINH]

Member of the Central Committee of the CPV; Chairman of the Nationalities Council of the National Assembly; \*President of the Vietnam-Laos Friendship Association; on 25 June 1984 he attended a meeting demanding the withdrawal of Thai forces from Lao territory. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Mỹ [NGUYEENX VAWN MYX], \*Lieutenant Colonel

\*Head of the Militia and Self Defense Bureau, Capital Military Region; his article on militia and self defense force training appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 3)

Phạm Đức Nam [PHAMJ DUWCS NAM]

Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Quang Nam-Danang Province; he was interviewed concerning progress in his province since 1975. (TO QUOC Jun 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Vĩnh Nghiệp [NGUYEENX VINHX NGHIEEPJ]

Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; his article on tree planting in Ho Chi Minh City appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 28 Jun 84 p 2)

Trần Phong [TRAANF PHONG]

\*Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union; \*Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Youth Federation; on 7-9 June 1984 he participated in a Vietnam Youth Union Congress in An Giang Province. (TIEN PHONG 26 Jun-2 Jul 84 p 2)

Phan Quang [PHAN QUANG]

Head of a section in the Propaganda and Training Department of the CPV Central Committee; on 15 June 1984 he attended a press conference on the upcoming 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 27 Jun 84 p 2)

Vũ Quang [VUX QUANG]

\*Member of the CPV Committee, Hanoi; \*Secretary of the CPV Committee, Son Tay City; recently he attended a physical education and sports conference. (THE DUC THE THAO 16 Jun 84 p 4)



Nguyễn Mạnh Quân [NGUYEENX MANHJ QUAAN]

\*Acting Editor-in-chief of the weekly newspaper of the Vietnam Democratic Party DOC LAP; recently he participated in activities marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 4)

Lê Sinh Tăng [LEE SINH TAWNG]

\*Head of the Animal Husbandry Department, Ministry of Agriculture; his article "Important Measures for Developing Hog Raising During 1984" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 2)

Đào An Thái [DAOF AN THAIS]

\*Head of the Archives Department; on 21 June 1984 he attended a conference of socialist nation archivists held in Ho Chi Minh City. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Jun 84 p 1)

Trịnh Ngọc Thái [TRINHJ NGOCJ THAIS]

Vice President of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association; on 29 June 1984 he attended a government bond exhibit. (NHAN DAN 30 Jun 84 p 4)

Lê Thanh [LEE THANH], Major General

\*Deputy Commander, 7th Military Region; on 23 June 1984 he attended the return to the SRV of members of the Vietnam Volunteer Forces in Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 4)

Nguyễn Thị Thanh [NGUYEENX THIJ THANH]

\*Head of the Civil Proselytizing and Front Department of the CPV Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 27-30 June 1984 she attended a Youth Union congress in Ho Chi Minh City. (TIEN PHONG 10-16 Jul 84 p 2)

Nguyễn Văn Thanh [NGUYEENX VAWN THANH], \*Lieutenant Colonel

\*Head of the Militia and Self Defense Forces Bureau, 3rd Military Region; his article on militia and self defense forces training appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 3)

Hoàng Thảo [HOANGF THAOR]

\*Standing Member of the CPV Committee, Haiphong; on 2 July 1984 he attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Nguyễn Toàn Thắng [NGUYEENX TOANF THAWNGS], \*Colonel

\*Head of the Militia and Self Defense Forces Bureau, 4th Military Region; his article on militia and self defense forces training appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 3)

Trần Thị Thanh Thọ [TRAAHF THIJ THANH THOJ]

\*Standing Member of the CPV Committee, Haiphong; on 2 July 1984 she attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Hồ Sĩ Thoảng [HOOF SIX THOANG<sup>2</sup>]

Deputy Head of the Vietnam Science Institutes; in April or May 1984 he spoke at the Vietnam Socialist Party Club on developments in the chemical sector. (TO QUOC Jun 84 p 33)

Nguyễn Văn Thở [NGUYEENX VAWN THOW], \*Lieutenant Colonel

\*Head of the Training Section, Militia and Self Defense Training Bureau, 7th Military Region; his article on militia and self defense forces training appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Jun 84 p 3)

Phan Thu [PHAN THU], Colonel

His article "Electronic Combat in Modern Warfare" appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 24 Jun 84 p 2)

Nguyễn Văn Thử<sup>2</sup> [NGUYEENX VAWN THUR], deceased

Born on 27 February 1915 at Vung Lien District, Cuu Long Province; Member of the CPV; President of the Vietnam Red Cross Association; President-emeritus of the Vietnam Stomatology Association; Head of the Central Stomatology Association; former Chairman of the Public Health and Social Services Committee of the 6th National Assembly; former Head of the South Vietnam Public Health Department; former Vice Minister of Public Health; former Vice President of the Vietnam General Association of Medicine; he died in Ho Chi Minh City on 24 June 1984. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 1)

Xuân Thủy<sup>2</sup> [XUAAN THUYR]

Member of the Presidium of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 30 June 1984 he participated in ceremonies marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

-Băng Văn Thưởng [DAWNGJ VAWN THUWOWNGJ]

Secretary of the CPV Committee, Tay Ninh Province; on 23 June 1984 he attended the return to the SRV of members of the Vietnam Volunteer Forces in Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Tiến [NGUYEENX VAWN TIEENS]

Member of the Presidium and Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 30 June 1984 he participated in activities marking the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Lê Toàn [LEE TOANF]

\*Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, Haiphong; on 2 July 1984 he attended activities marking the 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 11 Jul 84 p 6)

Võ Đức Tôt [VOX DUWCS TOOTS]

\*Acting Chairman of the People's Committee, Tay Ninh Province; on 23 June 1984 he attended the return to the SRV of members of the Vietnam Volunteer Forces in Kampuchea. (NHAN DAN 26 Jun 84 p 1)

Hoàng Tư Trai [HOANGF TUV TRAI]

Deputy Director General of the Vietnam News Agency; on 29 June 1984 he attended a government bond exhibit. (NHAN DAN 30 Jun 84 p 4)

Nguyễn Tấn Gi Trọng [NGUYEENX TAANS GI TRONGJ]

Standing Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Democratic Party; on 15 June 1984 he held a press conference to discuss the upcoming 40th anniversary of the founding of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 27 Jun 84 p 2)

Hoàng Tú [HOANGF TUS]

Standing Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Democratic Party; on 15 June 1984 he held a press conference to discuss the upcoming 40th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party. (DOC LAP 27 Jun 84 p 2)

Hoàng Tung [HOANGF TUNGF]

Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV; recently he attended the return to Hanoi of the SRV delegation to the CEMA conference in Moscow. (NHAN DAN 24 Jun 84 p 4)

Trần Danh Tuyên [TRAANF ZANH TUYEEN]

\*Chairman of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian People; on 30 June 1984 he attended a conference of peace, friendship and solidary associations of Vietnam. (NHAN DAN 2 Jul 84 p 1)

Đoàn Thanh Vi [DOANF THANH VIJ]

\*Secretary of the CPV Committee, Minh Hai Province; his article "Minh Hai--  
Nine Months After the Congress" appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN  
26 Jun 84 p 3)

Nguyễn Văn Xuyên [NGUYEENX VAWN XUYEEN]

\*Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Long An Province; he was mentioned  
in an article about economic construction activities in his province. (TIEN  
PHONG 26 Jun-2 Jul 84 p 1)

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**DATE FILMED**

20 AUGUST 1984

